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Trade, Politics, and Struggle for Power: Soviet Diplomacy on the Saudi-Arabian Track between the 1920s and 1930s
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Trade, Politics, and Struggle for Power: Soviet Diplomacy on the Saudi-Arabian Track between the 1920s and 1930s
Аннотация
Код статьи
S086919080031491-7-1
DOI
10.31696/S086919080031491-7
Тип публикации
Статья
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Наумкин Виталий Вячеславович 
ORCID: 0000-0001-9644-9862
Должность: Научный руководитель Института востоковедения РАН; Декан Восточного факультета Государственного академического университета гуманитарных наук
Аффилиация:
Институт востоковедения РАН
Государственный академический университет гуманитарных наук
Адрес: Москва, Россия
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Выпуск 4
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190-203
Аннотация

The article is dedicated to exploring a most critical phase in the relationships between the USSR and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on the basis of documents available with the RF Foreign Policy Archive and British archives. The period under scrutiny covers the late 1920-s until early 1930-s, when the relationships between the USSR and the KSA were undergoing an active development phase due to Moscow’s growing prestige on the international arena. Many of the archival materials are introduced into the science domain for the first time by the author. The article highlights a personal agency factor in the work of the Soviet diplomacy along the Saudi Arabia track, including a contribution made by Soviet Plenipotentiaries to the KSA Karim Hakimov and Nazir Tyuryakulov into the promotion of bilateral contacts and the success achieved by them. Certain circumstances underlying the crisis experienced by Georgy Chicherin, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, during the last years of his office tenure, and his disagreement with the heads of other agencies are revealed. The specific aspects of work of the Soviet diplomats under harsh local environment are analyzed, also the information communicated by them to the Center from Jeddah, which adequately portrayed the situation in the Kingdom, is disclosed. The importance of their ideas to facilitate commercial ties with the KSA and allow the Soviet products to access the Saudi market is underlined, likewise the expediency of transforming the Soviet Diplomatic agency and General Consulate into a Permanent Diplomatic Representation, its head becoming the Doyen of the diplomatic corps during that period.

Ключевые слова
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Karim Khakimov, Nazir Tyuryakulov, Ibn Saud, reformatting, rebellion of Ikhwans, Joseph Stalin, trade, dual state, Georgy Chicherin, Great Britain, Maksim Litvinov
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01.08.2024
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25.08.2024
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1

Foreword
2 The turn of the 1920s – early 1930-s was the time of substantial changes in the policies pursued by the Soviet Union in the Arab West, when the emphasis was placed on two tracks – fostering relationships with the only two formally independent states in the region: first, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (this name was given to the state in 1932, when the Kingdom of Hijaz and the Sultanate of Nejd with the newly annexed areas were formally merged under King Abd al-Aziz bin Saud)1 and, second, the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen. The evolution of Soviet policies along the Saudi track is reviewed, in particular, in the writings of such Soviet/Russian authors, as I.A. Alexandrov (I.A. Melikhov), A.V. Vasilyev, A.G. Georgiev (A.G. Aksenenok), G.G. Kosach, T.A. Mansurov, Y.S. Melkumyan, O.B. Ozerov, V.V. Ozoling, N.I. Proshin, A.I. Yakovlev2 and others, and also in the conceptually close works by Saudi and Western authors, published in the Russian translation (above all others, Majed al-Turki and Awadh al-Badi /Synopsis of a Thesis/ as well as Natana DeLong-Bas3).
1. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud (born in 1877, ruled until his death in 1953) – the founder and ruler of the Saudi state. Hereinafter, everywhere in the article: Ibn Saud.

2. Alexandrov I.А. The Persian Gulf Monarchies: Modernization Stage. М.: Delo i Service, 2000; Vasilyev А.М. The History of Saudi Arabia. М.: Klassika Plus, 1999; Georgiev А.G. The Oil Monarchies of Arabia: Development Problems. М.: Nauka, 1983; Kosach G.G., Melkumyan Y.S. The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: Priorities, Tracks, Decision Making Process. М.: The Middle East Institute, М, 2003.; Mansurov Т.А. Plenipotentiary Representative Nazir Tyuryakulov. Diplomat. Politician. М.: Citizen, 2003; Ozerov О.B. Karim Hakimov: Life Chronicle. М.: КМК Science Publications Partnership, 2020; Ozoling V.V. The Oil Monarchies of Arabia. Development Problems. М:, 1983; Proshin N.I. Saudi Arabia: an Essay on History and Economy. М.: Nauka, 1964; Yakovlev А.I. Saudi Arabia: Evolution Paths. М.: IV RAN (Institute of Oriental Studies), 1999.

3. . Аl-Тurki М. The Saudi-Russian Relationships in the Global and Regional Processes (1926–2004). М.: 2005; Аl-Badi А. Saudi-Jordanian Relations: Territorial Rivalry over the Al Jouf and Wadi as-Sirhan Border Areas. Thesis in Candidacy for a Degree of Ph.D of Historical Sciences (Adviser V.V. Naumkin). М.: Institute of Oriental Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). 1998; DeLong-Bas N. “Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad”. Under the editorship and with a preface by Vitaly V. Naumkin. М.: Ladomir, 2010.
3

These changes in the USSR policies of that time found their way, in particular, into the replacement of the senior management echelon of the USSR Foreign Ministry and also of the heads of the Soviet diplomatic missions in the abovementioned Arab states, which signaled transformation in the domestic political environment of the Soviet Union and resulted in the consolidation of all the levers of power in Joseph Stalin’s hands. A high priority in the activities of the Soviet diplomacy along the Saudi track was attached to the fight aimed at making progress with the drafts of political and trade agreements between the USSR and Saudi Arabia, withstanding competition with the UK and counteracting the pro-UK Saudi elites, as well as undertaking efforts to promote the bilateral Soviet-Saudi trade and economic contacts. The introduction of new materials into scholarly discourse allows to uncover and theoretically assess an entire body of formerly unknown or little known facts, thus helping us to bring the research of this period in the history of Soviet-Saudi relationships, essential for the understanding of the circumstances behind the evolution of the Soviet policies towards the Middle East, to a new higher level. A crucial role in this process was played by Georgy V. Chicherin, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs4.

4. Chicherin, Georgy Vassilievich (1872-1936) – a Russian Revolutionary, Russian and Soviet statesman, diplomat (1872 – 1936), Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1918, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, then the USSR throughout 1918 – 1930, member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks throughout 1925 – 1930).
4

Chicherin Steps Down
5 In the late 1920s Georgy Chicherin, as can be judged from the available documents, is experiencing a serious personal crisis associated both with his deteriorating health and the deep frustration he is experiencing because of the strengthening of Joseph Stalin’s personal power, the first repressions in the country, and the unsuccessful attempts to organize the work of the NKID (RCFA) and achieve implementation of Chicherin’s own ideas about what the foreign policy of the Soviet Union should be. In addition, Stalin now personally decided all questions of the country’s foreign policy solely in the Politburo, and the People’s Commissar felt oppressed by his clearly diminished role in decision-making.
6 In September 1928, shortly after the completion of the process of the Shakhtinsky case, the People’s Commissar again left for treatment in Germany, but now he stayed there for quite a long time. This did not mean that Chicherin was completely removed from political work, but his deputy, Maksim Litvinov5, later stated that he had actually ran the People’s commissariat over 1928-1930 when Georgy Chicherin had been only formally still occupying the post of People’s Commissar6. One can hardly agree with the opinion of Timothy E. O’Connor [О’Коннор, 1991, с. 231] and some other foreign biographers of the People’s Commissar, that after Chicherin’s resignation, there was a new line of Stalin – “to get rid of all members of the intelligentsia” in the leadership of the country. However, that was not the point. Firstly, Chicherin, whose health had deteriorated sharply, really needed serious treatment, which he had previously undergone in Germany. Secondly, Stalin in the later years of terrible mass repressions showed a seemingly inexplicable special attitude to certain prominent members of the Soviet intelligentsia, who escaped the most tragic fate. Thirdly, after the long years of hard work at the post of People’s Commissar, Chicherin, sometimes did not demonstrate his readiness to accept some new standards of life of the state and society, which the leader of the Soviet state had introduced.
5. Litvinov Maxim Maximovich (Meer-Genokh Movshevich Vallakh, 1876 – 1951) – Russian Revolutionary, Russian and Soviet statesman, diplomat, RSFSR diplomatic representative in the US in July 1918, RSFSR Plenipotentiary Representative in the UK in July-September 1918, in 1921 – 1930 – Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, then the USSR, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR throughout 1930 – 1939, member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (the Bolsheviks) throughout 1934 – 1941, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the US throughout 1941 – 1943. Wife – Low-Litvinova Ivy Walterovna (1889 – 1977) – an English and Soviet writer, translator.

6. “Conversation of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Com. M.M. Litvinov with Foreign Correspondents”. Izvestiya. 26 July 1930.
7 An unsent secret letter by Georgy Vassilyevich, written by him in the form of testament before resigning in early July 1930, addressed to Valerian Kuibyshev7, whom Georgy Chicherin really wanted to see as his successor, spoke much about the changed situation in the country, which could not but affect the NKID. It is difficult to say whether the choice of the People's Commissar was due to Kuibyshev's business acumen, as he did not in fact have big experience in foreign policy, or due to Chicherin’s sympathies which he had never concealed to professionals and well-educated people who came from intelligentsia and even from the nobility, why the Bolshevik leaders from the bottom felt mistrust and even hostility towards him. Hostile relations, long established between the People’s Commissar and Maksim Litvinov made the situation worse. However, it was Litvinov who was appointed as the new People’s Commissar, as a result of which the note remained in the classified personal archive of Georgy Chicherin. The testament-letter8 contained a lot of unflattering assessments on a number of high-positioned figures sometimes dictated by the hostile relations they had developed with the Commissar. Below are some of the individual provisions of the complete version of this document (there were all in all four of it). It reads: “Notes for Kuibyshev, the new NKID,” and at the top of the document: “Not sent due to the appointment of Litvinov. July 1930.” The document begins like this:
7. Kuibyshev Valerian Vladimirovich (1888 – 1935) – a prominent Soviet Communist Party and government leader, member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of the Bolsheviks) throughout 1922 – 1923 and member of the Central Committee Politburo throughout 1927 – 1935. His third wife, Galina, was the daughter of Revolutionaries: a well-known diplomat, the first Ambassador of the USSR in the US A.A. Troyanovsky and Y.F. Rozmirovich, former wife of People’s Commissar for Justice N.V. Krylenko.

8. https//idd.mid.ru/ru_RU/informacionno-spravocnye-materialy/asset_publisher/WsjViuPpktam/content/neizvestnyj-cicerin-cast-2-
8 “Dear Comrade,
9 I congratulate you, but do not envy you.
10 Clarify your rights and the Constitution of the Collegium.9 Comrade Litvinov’s theory was this: every member of the Collegium operates certain area, submits questions on it to the Collegium and then carries out the decisions of the latter, sends out letters and telegrams to the Collegium members for information. With Comrade Karakhan10, who is in charge of the East11, things were completely different, as he and I would have daily discussions about new developments in the East and our work together was harmonious. Comrade Litvinov has never gone this rout; he would always respond that three days a week I would take part in the Collegium’s meetings where I could speak my mind and can write him letters on specific issues, but no further contact was required. On matters of the West, I was nothing but an ordinary member of the Collegium, but inasmuch as I went back and forth, tried to influence decisions, there was always tension. The obligatory participation of Comrade Litvinov in the Politburo for Western affairs strengthened his role; I conducted the participation of Comrade Karakhan in Politburo on Eastern affairs to weaken the exclusive role of Comrade Litvinov. I myself was politically so powerless that any statement of mine to the Politburo in favor of some opinion became a reason for them to take the opposite decision (‘non-revolutionary’). I don’t understand: if they don’t trust me, why don’t they assign me to another job? Now it’s late, I’m like a toy, broken by a careless child. When Comrade Karakhan was pushed out,12 everyone saw that it was more profitable keep Comrade Litvinov; so did Kopp,13 Stomonyakov,14 and others. I consider Comrade Karakhan a very subtle, brilliant, talented politician. On the contrary, Comrade Stomonyakov is a dry formalist, with zero flexibility, no political instinct, pugnacious, unpleasant, who spoils relations. For small Baltics, this is not an issue, but for Poland something else entirely is required.”
9. The Collegium and its territorial desks remained the main structural units of the NKID.

10. Karakhan, Lev Mikhailovich (1889 – 1937) – Russian Revolutionary, top-ranking diplomat, throughout 1921 – 1922, RSFSR Plenipotentiary Representative in Poland, throughout 1922 – 1923 – Head of the NKID (People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) Eastern Department, throughout 1923 – 1926, in China (since 1924, as an Ambassador), Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR throughout 1926 – 1934, in 1934 – 1937 – Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Turkey). Was married to a famous ballerina Marina T. Semenova. Was subject to repression in 1937.

11. The documents cited in the article reproduce the same spelling as in the original.

12. Most likely this refers to his departure to go work in China in 1923.

13. Kopp, Viktor Leontyevich (1880–1930) – Russian Revolutionary, Soviet diplomat, member of the Party from 1903, participant in the First World War, was held captive in Germany from 1915 to 1918, in 1919–1921 authorized agent for the NKID and the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade in Germany from May 1921, the representative of the Russian Federation for prisoners of war, in 1923–1925 member of the Collegium of the NKID, in 1925–1927 plenipotentiary in Japan, from 1927 to 1930 in Sweden.

14. Stomonyakov, Boris Spiridonovich (1882-1940) – Russian revolutionary, Soviet diplomat. Born in Odessa to a Bulgarian family, member of the Russian Federation since 1900, during the revolution of 1905 lived in Belgium, secretly bought weapons for revolutionaries. In 1915 he returned to Bulgaria, served in the army, from 1917 in Russia, in 1920– 1925 – authorized agent of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade in Berlin, in 1925–1938, member of the Collegiums of these commissariats, in 1932 signed a non-aggression agreement with Latvia, in 1933 the Soviet-Latvian trade agreement, from May 1934 to August 1938 Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Arrested in 1938, shot in 1940.
11 Behind the advice that Chicherin gives to the new People’s Commissar, rejection of some of the orders that prevailed at that time in the Commissariat can be seen. But it carries a very much businesslike tone and contains instruction regarding even minor technicalities, although relevant, such as:
12 “You need to ensure that copies of all papers received by Collegium members and to desks also come to you. You do not have to read everything (its content should be indicated somewhere on each document), but everything must pass through your hands: without this, policy will be conducted behind your back. At one time, I achieved this only after a long struggle, but during my long-term absence this fell by the wayside; you will now have to fix this. In addition to the main reports of the plenipotentiaries, there are documents of lesser importance that also come from them: be careful so that there is no separate policy being conducted…
13 Yet another painful and difficult-to-resolve issue is the private correspondence of members of the Collegium with the plenipotentiaries and others. I was powerless to resolve this issue. When Comrade Kopp was our plenipotentiary in Tokyo, Comrade Litvinov opposed our Far East policy through private correspondence with him; Besedovsky15 covers Litvinov’s private correspondence with Kopp in detail, but Besedovsky generally lies, as I heard about this correspondence from some of our best sources. When a Litvinov’s supporter, Comrade Yurenev16, was appointed to Prague instead of Comrade Mostovenko17, in the latter’s hands, due to unforeseen chance, landed private letter from Comrade Litvinov to Comrade Yurenev, in which Comrade Litvinov instructed Comrade Yurenev to collect compromising material against Comrade Mostovenko given the forthcoming struggle between Litvinov and the former (Private correspondence and private conversations of some members of the Collegium were a source of slander against me.) You need to revise the rules such that letters to these addresses can also be sent by diplomatic mail...” [Chicherin’s testament letter, https//idd.mid.ru/ru_RU/informacionno-spravocnye-materialy/asset_publisher/WsjViuPpktam/content/neizvestnyj-cicerin-cast-2-].
15. Besedovsky G.Z. (1896–1949) – from September 1925 worked as an adviser to the embassy of the USSR in France, from April 1926 – in Japan, from May 1927 – again in France. In October 1929, he refused to return to Moscow for fear of his imminent arrest, stayed with his family in Paris, where in 1931 he published his book “On the Paths to Thermidor.” In it, he distortedly, slanderously described the situation at that time in the NKID.

16.

17. Mostovenko, Pavel Nikolayevich (1881–1938) – Russian Revolutionary, diplomat, member of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party from 1901. In October 1917 became Chairman of the Moscow Council of Soldiers' Deputies, and one of the organizers of the October Uprising in Moscow. In 1921–1922 Plenipotentiary Envoy in Lithuania, in 1922–1923 – in Czechoslovakia, he led the illegal work of the Comintern in Germany during the revolutionary events of 1923, in 1924 was the authorized agent of the Supreme Council of the National Economy in Berlin. In 1925–1927 – Director of the All-Union Industrial Academy, in 1927-1930 – Dean of Higher Technical School named after N.E. Bauman.
14 It is clear that Chicherin’s critical, often extremely harsh and, perhaps, even biased assessments of some of his colleagues, were the result of his deep feelings for the calling of his life, which he was forced to leave. His testament-letter, although it contained a lot of specific business advice, is still filled with a bitter feeling of powerlessness. A subtle and insightful politician, Chicherin could not help but feel those negative trends in the country’s social climate, which in the future would lead to the tragic events of the second half of the 1930s.
15 From Germany, Chicherin wrote letters to the Politburo of the Central Committee criticizing the mistakes of the country’s foreign policy. For some unknown reason, Stalin for quite long does not remove Chicherin from his office, despite his long stay abroad and this criticism, and made efforts to encourage People’s Commissar to return to Moscow and not stay in Germany for good. Georgy Vassilyevich, however, could not be persuaded immediately. The government then sends the Kremlin’s chief doctor, Levin, to him, and then Deputy Commissar Lev Karakhan, who manages to arrange Chicherin’s arrival in Moscow.
16

What can explain the fact that Georgy Chicherin did not become a victim of repression? Was it the fact that he was just too weak, or that Stalin held him in high regard? The latter is all the more surprising when you consider that the former People’s Commissar was practically the only person who allowed himself in the past to openly criticize the leader, yet he never became a supporter of Trotsky, nor could he stand the Trotskyites. After retirement and until his death in 1936, he led a reclusive life in his apartment on Spaso-Peskovsky Lane, while US Ambassador to the USSR George Kennan wrote that Chicherin suffered from polyneuritis and diabetes, and as if “his nervous или mental illness eventually led to dementia” [Kennan, 1967, notes 63 and 64; O’Коннор, 1991, с. 232]. He died of cerebral hemorrhage on July 7th.
17

Assessment of the Status of Relationships between the USSR and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Early 1930-s by the Soviet Diplomats in Jeddah
18 Taking over after Kerim Hakimov18, as a Consul General in Saudi Arabia, Nazir Tyuryakulov19 arrived in Jeddah on September 29 1928, but delivered the diplomatic credentials on February 26, 1930. Overwhelmed with enthusiasm, the diplomat started to research the situation in this “dual” state (at that time, comprising the Kingdom of Hijaz and the Sultanate of Nejd), without hesitation, proceeding from the premise that its relationships with the USSR were directly impacted by the general changes affecting the position of Abd al-Aziz bin Saud’s state in the international arena.
18. Hakimov, Kerim Abdraufovich (1892 – 1938) – Russian Revolutionary, diplomat, Soviet Communist Party and government official, Russian and Soviet Consul General in Mashhad and Rasht, Persia, diplomatic representative of the USSR in the Kingdom of Hijaz, the Sultanate of Nejd and the annexed areas throughout 1926 – 1928, Plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Yemen Kingdom throughout 1929 – 1931, Plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia throughout 1935 – 1937. Was subject to repression in 1938.

19. Tyuryakulov, Nazir Tyuryakulovich (1892 – 1937) – Russian and Soviet Revolutionary, Soviet Communist Party and government official, publicist and journalist, diplomat. In the 1920-s, he held several top government posts in Turkestan, including Secretary of the Turkestan Communist Party, Chairman of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920. In 1928, he commenced his diplomatic service in the capacity of the head of diplomatic agency and General Consulate in Jeddah, transformed in 1930 into the Plenipotentiary Representation Office, thus becoming de facto the Ambassador. Was subject to repression in 1937.
19 Summing up his work during the first months of his stay in the country, in February 1929 Nazir Tyuryakulov sent to the NKID a detailed political letter for the period of 1928 – early 1929 which reached the People’s Commissariat only on March 21. It was a tough period for the state, as the Ikhwans, who had until recently been the main core of the King’s support, stirred up a rebellion headed by F. Al-Dawish and S. bin Bijad20, and issued a number of ultimatums to the ruler. (The end of the 1920s represented a period of active demonstrations against the King by the Ikhwans, who had until recently been his main core of support. F. Al-Dawish, S. bin Bijad, as well as the Shaykh of the Ajman tribe, Zaydan bin Hislayn, stood at the head of this movement21, having issued a number of ultimative demands to the King inback in late 1926.) Thanks to the efforts of Soviet diplomats, already in the spring of 1928, the first consignment of Soviet goods sent to Hijaz was sold. However, Moscow did not find it easy to do business on the Hijaz market due to pro-British Hijaz merchants and ill-wishers in the local elite. Under their pressure, then-Finance Minister Abdullah Damluji, ostensibly to protect the local market, pushed through a resolution of the government of Hijaz to suspend the activities of Soviet trade organizations in the Kingdom until such time when a trade and political treaty was signed. The Diplomatic Agency did not have the right to engage independently in commercial activities. Soviet goods brought to the Kingdom became subject to higher duties than goods from other countries.
20. The rebellion was stirred up against Ibn Saud in the late 1928 by a faction of Ikhwans, primarily from the Mutayr tribe, headed by Faysal al-Dawish (or: Duwaish), and from the Ajman tribe, headed by Sultan bin Bijad al-Otaybi, who demanded that the expansion of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia into the territory of British protectorates of Transjordan, Iraq and Kuwait be continued. In 1929, bloody clashes of the rebels took place against the troops of Ibn Saud, vwho was not keen on entering into direct confrontation with the British. The Ikhwans suffered a defeat. Ibn Bijad was killed in 1931, while Dawish died in a Riyadh prison in the same year.

21. See about this in detail: A.V. Vasilyev. History of Saudi Arabia (1745–1973). Moscow: GRVL 1982. Pp. 298–319.
20 Nazir Tyuryakulov wrote: “The foreign policy of Ibn Saud in the second half of last year entered a new period, one characterized by the expansion of both the Kingdom’s political and trade relations with other countries. This circumstance is in close connection not only with changes in Anglo-Hijaz 22 relations, but also with the organic growth of the state and the overall strengthening of its internal and external position. Truly, Ibn Saud’s steps in this direction are not particularly resolute and some timidity still affects his actions. But, nevertheless, comparing the current period of international relations of the Kingdom with other countries with all previous ones, we can make only one conclusion: albeit slowly but systematically, but Ibn Saud is expanding his relations, step by step, with the outside world and is strengthening his international position”.
22. According to the old Russian spelling rules, Hejaz is Hijaz, Angora is Ankara, “Hipra” and “Sovpra” stand for Hijaz and Soviet government, respectively.
21 The head of the diplomatic mission also noted an inconsistent character of Ibn Saud’s policies: “The history of Soviet-Hijaz relations over the past year can serve as a typical illustration of this process. This relationship most fully reflects all the fluctuations of Ibn Saud’s foreign policy and its positive aspirations, which have been aimed at ensuring the independence of his country. First, mutual recognition, then the admission of our trade and mutual benefits, then the ‘private,’ unofficial boycott of our goods and the arrest of our employees and, finally, the ‘request’ to temporarily refrain from conducting trade with the threat of raising customs duties on our goods if they are shipped, despite the friendly intentions of the Hijazi government – this is the path that Soviet-Hijaz relations traveled up to the point of beginning my work in the country.”
22 But what was the essence of the exclusive regime set up in the Kingdom for the Soviet trade, and was it conceived as a long-term vehicle? The Plenipotentiary explained: “The country has a free trade principle and therefore our trade cannot be prohibited. Soviet trade in Hijaz is not prohibited. But, in the interests of their country, the Hijazi government asks the Soviet leadership to temporarily refrain from conducting commerce. In case we do not adhere to this friendly reaching out by the Hijazi government, and we continue our trading activity, our goods will be faced with increased customs rates (approximately 10% higher than currently). During the first half of last year, before my meeting with the King, Soviet-Hijaz relations were granted the exclusive regime about which I spoke above. Ibn Saud, who was then suffering a spree of aggravation due to internal (preparing for decisive actions against Dawish) and external (England would not agree to a treaty, the activities of Iraqi emissaries intensified, and the Dawish forces were supplied with weapons through Kuwait “merchants”) contradictions, understood the incompatibility of the exclusive regime in relation to our trade with normal, friendly relations with the USSR. I addressed the last point (the incompatibility of the existing regime with normal relations) using an energetic tone in the audience of the royal adviser, Yusuf Yasin”.
23 Tyuryakulov, circumstances permitting, works actively with all of the influential personalities representing the ruling elite of the country. He writes: “The general meaning of my statement to Yasin (June) was that, in view of the fact of the gradual deterioration of our affairs in Hijaz, we are seriously worried about the further development of Soviet-Hijaz relations, that we had no reason to expect from Hijaz government this type of treatment of our interests and prestige and that we would like to know the opinion of the government about how the future looks. As a specific proposal, which was prompted by the desire to normalize Soviet-Hijaz relations, I raised the question of the immediate elimination of the existing regime in relation to our trade and negotiations in order to consolidate friendly relations between the two countries and resolve trade issues.”
24 The plenipotentiary cited data that confirmed the unfriendly position held by head of the foreign affairs department, Fuad Hamza, and his interest in maintaining the discriminatory regime applicable for Soviet goods. But did the head of the foreign ministry, who, as Soviet diplomats believed, was practically ruled by Philby23, not bother to even inform the King about some very important matters? Or did the Governor of Hijaz, son of the King and future King, Emir Faisal, made decisions on his own? One way or another, the plenipotentiary reported [Naumkin, 2018, p.312 ff]:
23. Philby, Harry St. John Bridger (1885 – 1960) – British colonial administrator, famous traveler, explorer, writer. Converted to Islam, served as advisor to Ibn Saud. Author of the most valuable scientific descriptions of the then Arabia. Father of the renowned deep-cover agent Kim Philby, who worked for Moscow.
25 “In order to describe the attitude of their leaders to our questions, I will use the following moment as an example: the Foreign Minister in every possible way delayed, slowed down and interfered with my actions. Knowing that the King was inclined to make concessions to us, for example, on the issue of negotiations, he tried to distort my thoughts and intentions presenting them to the King in my absence. This was clearly seen by the King’s bewilderment, which was caused by my request to exchange letters, stating the parties’ readiness for negotiations and the purpose of the negotiations. Hamza, who, before my meeting with the King, in various ways dissuaded me from communicating in writing, hurried to clarify the issue in reference to our demand that statements and responses from the King be captured. In the presence of Hamza, I explained the misunderstanding to the King, and the issue was resolved in my favor. It was evident that the King was surprised by what had happened.
26 The plan of Hamza and Philby who was standing behind him, seemed to be that without any letters of commitment, the upcoming negotiations would be informal. In such a scenario, Hamza would feel more free. The King understood my attitude towards him and towards Hamza were not the same, and in the appropriate place of his answer he stressed that he, before the Soviet government, would never back down from his word…. In such an atmosphere, negotiations between me and Hamza began. In accordance with our directives and instructions, I led the negotiations in such a way in order to achieve a quick conclusion, above all, of a political treaty. According to my calculations, the conclusion of a trade treaty was to encounter a number of barriers (the pressure from our old antagonists), and it was necessary to put it up for joint discussion only when it would not hinder the fulfillment of the task of our political consolidation. The issue of the regime was temporarily dropped, since Ibn Saud who was tied up preparations for the war in Nejd (the mobilization of forces and funds was partially accomplished with the assistance of large merchants), asked us not to force the issue just yet. The issue of so-called compensation was also (temporarily?) dropped, because neither the King himself, nor Yasin, nor Hamza raised the issue again nor was it articulated by either of them. With my statement to Hamza, that in the process of negotiations, the Hijaz government can feel free to put forward and raise any issue for joint discussion if it finds necessary and useful, the issue was closed. Since then, this question has never been raised.”
27 “…Thus, during the autumn of last year (up until December 14),” the plenipotentiary continued, “I had to carry on tedious negotiations with Hamza, agreeing with him that, for speed and convenience, we will first of all discuss issues concerning concluding a political treaty. Under the pretext of not having time, he asked me to draft something. Wanting to speed up the work and not give him the opportunity to refer to his lack of free time, I presented him with a draft treaty with the exception of the article on the rejection of capitulation rights and privileges, and on the promotion of the sanitary autonomy of Hijaz and on waqufs. I thought that the introduction of these articles…would be more effective later when the King returns to Mecca. Besides I was expecting the issue of ‘compensation’ to be raised. In this case, these articles could play the role of ‘rents’. In a month, when the King returns to Hijaz, I expect to put them to joint discussion at the appropriate moment. On the issue of waqufs, our second tactical line seems more reasonable to me: to withdraw from the discussion.”
28 Whether the tactical line suggested by Tyuryakulov for negotiations was right, was supposed to be proven by time. In this matter as in many others, Tyuryakulov sought if not to justify then to understand the King. He concluded:
29 “Under these conditions, it is obvious that Ibn Saud cannot afford to have his refusal of the Soviet waqufs become a precedent. On the other hand, we cannot abandon our principle line. Under these conditions, it remains to show to the people of Hijaz that the issue has not been studied and it must be removed from the day’s agenda. Hamza did not make any significant contribution to our project, speaking only about the undesirability of introducing articles on waqufs, on the USSR’s assistance to the transit of pilgrims and on the mutual banning of organizations hostile to the other side. I offered to formulate his wishes in writing. He did not. Negotiations proceeded at a slow pace, until on December 14 he made the following statement in the presence of Comrade Tuymetov24: wanting to show his friendship and sincerity towards the Soviet government and best contribute to the success of our negotiations, the King decided to eliminate the existing regime in relation to Soviet trade and restore the old state of affairs. If at one time in the interests of the country the King was forced to create this regime, now with the absence of such reasons that caused him to do so, he is meeting the wishes of the Soviet government halfway and would cancel the existing regime.”
24. Tuymetov, Yusuf Galyautdinovich (1893 – 1938) – Soviet diplomat, was engaged in diplomatic service in Yemen and Saudi Arabia (1st Secretary of the General Consulate in Jeddah), fell victim to repression in 1938.
30 Nazir Tyuryakulov clarified: “Pointing out that the King’s gesture will be met in Moscow with satisfaction and that this bewilderment caused by the creation of the existing regime will be eliminated, I asked him if I could inform my government about the new decision of the King based on his oral confirmation statement. He answered in the affirmative, adding that in 2-3 weeks he would be able to give me written confirmation of this current statement. He justified the need for this term with considerations of formal nature: he needed to prepare papers, to issue them to the governorship, to inform the authorities, etc. However, all the deadlines have since passed. We have not received the promised letter from his minister. My last conversation with Emir Faisal on January 25 in Mecca supported my opinion on this issue: there are no big obstacles to settling the issue of Soviet trade. This issue is in principle considered resolved, only needing a formal completion upon the return of the King to Hijaz.”
31 Nazir Tyuryakulov notes factors that could have contributed to the resolution of the debate on Soviet trade with Hijaz and ending the current impasse: “In connection with the trade issue, I would especially note one very important point: our opponents always tried to create the impression in leading circles that Soviet trade was disruptive for market relations. At one time (the end of 1928), Hamza cited this argument as an excuse for the special regime introduced at that time.
32 Throughout last year we stood on the sidelines of the market. Meanwhile, the current state of the market cannot be qualified as depressive. This circumstance significantly strengthens our position with the King.”
33 The plenipotentiary also mentioned one undeniable success of Soviet diplomacy: “Describing our position in Hijaz, I can point to the reorganization of our institution into a diplomatic mission and the retention of seniority in the diplomatic corps as a positive development for us”.
34 Indeed, the parties finally agreed to raise the level of the diplomatic representation of the USSR in the Kingdom, and the Diplomatic Agent and the Consul General became the Plenipotentiary Representative and Extraordinary Envoy. Therefore, on February 26, 1930 in Mecca, Tyuryakulov presented his credentials to the Governor of the King in Hijaz, Emir Faisal.
35 The plenipotentiary wrote: “A completely new situation is being created both in the country and in its foreign policy, which should positively reflect on Soviet-Hijaz relations. We must persist in our work towards contractually finalizing our political and trade relations with that country. I think that we will achieve this precisely this year, when 1) Headwinds are expected in ruling echelons of Hijazi government apparatus. 2) Unity no longer exists among our opponents. The campaign of distrust is being intensively conducted against foreign Arabs, and in their intolerant attitude toward the ‘Shamis’ (Syrians), the Nejdis and the Hijazis are absolutely unanimous… Throughout this period, we have continued to maintain and strengthen our ties and acquaintances with government and merchant circles of Hijaz. In connection with the turnaround in the Soviet-Hijaz relations, the interest of these circles in us has increased significantly. I am due to have a meeting with the Minister of Finance Abdullah Suleyman25, organized at the initiative of the latter. I attach great importance to this meeting, since the Minister of Finance plays a leading role in matters of government supplies and is very authoritative before the King.
25. Suleyman, Abdullah, according to the view held by Soviet diplomats, belonged to those, who supported the promotion of close trading ties between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the USSR.
36 We must use the material interest of these circles to achieve our goals as soon as possible.”
37 The political report of 1930 also contained an analysis of the Kingdom of Ibn Saud’s relations with London as well as the countries of the region. Reading the text, you can see that the Umm al-Qura newspaper was perhaps the main source of information here, although the plenipotentiary and his staff held more than enough meetings with well-informed interlocutors. It is obvious that the fact that the diplomats used press, in such an exotic for those times language like Arabic.
38

Ibn Saud Seeks Rapprochement with London
39

In 1929, Ibn Saud appealed to the British with a request to assist him in building his own military air force, hoping that the planes would be presented to him gratis as thanks for countering the actions of the “Bolshevik agents” in the Kingdom during Hajj, of what he informed the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. Not for the first time a dispute arose again between the British agencies over how to react to the King’s request. The Foreign Office on August 27 received a letter from the Colonial Office, which stated that they were in agreement with the dispatch from Cairo No. 496 that addressed in the part concerning the impossibility of raising the subject of subsidies for Ibn Saud again. The letter contained a reference to the dispatch from Baghdad on June 10, which, inter alia, read: “The proposal to supply planes and other materials free of charge may cause an unfavorable reaction in Iraq...” Representatives of the Colonial Office at an inter-agency meeting held on July 5, raised the question of discussing the price of the proposed provision of military aviation to the King, referring to the inexpediency of gratuitous provision of weapons by His Majesty’s government to “a proven enemy of the Iraqi state”.
40 The response from the Foreign Office, signed by Mr. Butler, stated: “Our proposal to lower the cost by 10,000 Pounds Sterling was aimed at the following: 1) to show our approval to Ibn Saud and help him in his tireless work to prevent attacks from members of his tribes on the territory of the tribes under British control, for which the Foreign Office is administratively responsible; and 2) to provide him with the necessary financial support, in this case military aviation, within his financial capabilities. The main point in the dispatch of Lord Lloyd E 886 and E 3061 was that we must respond to the goodwill that Ibn Saud has shown us in various ways, who suggested that we actively cooperate with him and help in counteracting Bolshevik agents and persons with obvious Bolshevik views who come to Mecca during their pilgrimages. The Colonial Office in [document] E 2222 suggested that we find it expedient to make an offer in line with our trade agreement. But, first of all, we, as well as Sir Clayton and Mr. Bond, and the government of India rejected the idea of ​​trying to see the benefit of making a formal offer, including it in the context of our trade agreement...” [FO 371/13734, E 4241/381/91, 27 August 1929. Р. 16–17].
41 Ibn Saud continued to show great zeal in order to achieve closer relations with London, but the idea of ​​fighting Bolsheviks in Hijaz clearly did not help. Since the beginning of 1929, the King began actively to try to persuade the British to raise the level of relations with his state. At first, this did not work out for him. In response to a question from the acting Saudi Foreign Minister about the status of the British representation in the Kingdom, the acting British consul who was closing out his service in Jeddah, Hugh Stonehewer-Bird26 (he briefly stayed on this post, temporarily replacing Bullard who had left), informed him that no changes were foreseen [Mr. Bird to Mr. Seymour, FO 371, E 821/821/91, 23 January 1929]. To this, Fuad Hamza remarked that the “Bolshevik” (here he obviously played along with the English) and the Turkish representatives had presented their credentials to the King, and Mr. Bird – only his Royal commissioning. The British were not yet ready to raise the status of their consulate to that of a General Consulate. But the Saudi authorities hoped to play on the desire of London not to yield to their rivals represented by the USSR and Turkey and not completely reject Ibn Saud. It is noteworthy that the British continued to talk about the “government of al-Hijaz” while they continued to view Hijaz and Nejd as two different states although under the rule of one ruler. During the first years of operation of their agency and consulate, they viewed it as a diplomatic representation in Hijaz, and not in the Kingdom as a whole.
26. Stonehewer-Bird, Sir Hugh (1891–1973) - this British diplomat later, in 1940–1943, was plenipotentiary of the United Kingdom in Saudi Arabia, succeeding Reader Bullard (1936–1939), who in turn replaced Andrew Ryan (1930–1936).
42 The situation was complicated by the somewhat confusing system of distribution of responsibility in the Foreign Office (the Soviet system when compared to the British was rather simple), not to mention the aforementioned rivalry between various agencies. Until 1936 there was a main consular service in the Foreign Office and, in parallel with it, separate consular services for China, Japan, Siam and the Levant, with the latter being responsible for Hijaz (in 1936 they merged) [Leatherdale, 1983, pp. 85-86]. The double status of a representative in Jeddah – as both an agent and a consulate – was ambiguous. The representative was considered primarily as a consul who was obliged to deal mainly with people – the numerous pilgrims arriving from British India – and not engage in politics. That is why Bird, when he assumed the duties of the head of the Diplomatic Agency – Consulate General, demanded that London clarify who he was after all: a diplomatic agent or a consul. We note that in the case of the Soviet Diplomatic Agency – Consulate General such ambiguity did not occur, and that to some extent this double name was rather a euphemism since the mission was subordinate to the territorial unit, especially after the number of pilgrims from the Soviet Union was quickly brought to a minimum.
43 In the Foreign Office they also understood how difficult it would be to find a solid candidate for the post of Plenipotentiary (not to mention ambassador). The exhausting heat and humidity and the lack of basic amenities in Jeddah were not only frightening, but made it nearly impossible for a European to be there with his family.
44 But Bird himself in a letter to Seymour dated January 23, 1929 supported the proposal of the King to give the British mission the status of an agency and consulate general. He also understood that the King was also led by considerations of his own prestige; he wanted to have the official right to agree or disagree with the candidate for the post of the British representative. In his February 9 dispatch, Bird spoke in favor of having his successor having at least “the local rank of General Consul,” and on February 14 he put forward a new proposal: “I know that credentials are out of the question, but is it not possible to take a step towards their wishes informing them in advance about the name of my successor, and at least pretend to them that we ask them for consent to our appointment?” [Bird to Seymour, FO 371/13734, 14 February 1929; E 821/821/91, 14 February 1929].
45 Seymour replied: “We have so many subjects of dispute with the Hijaz government that, in my opinion, we should avoid unnecessary contradictions with them on formal subjects. Therefore, I propose that we could stretch this question and (1) ask the agrément for Mr. Bird’s successor and (2) give him credentials addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hijaz for his official accreditation as an agent” [Seymour to Bird, FO 371/13734, 25 February 1929, E821/821/91].
46 But this compromise idea at first also did not receive support in the Foreign Office: “I don’t like the idea of ​​asking for an agrément for the successor of Mr. Byrd. The waiting list for the consul’s post in Jeddah is limited, and the refusal to accept our appointee will add to our difficulties ... Arabs may object to our candidate... I think we should exclude the idea of an agrément”.
47 George V27 appointed a thirty-six-year-old diplomat William Bond, like his predecessors, an Agent and Consul in Hijaz, and Hamza had to reluctantly express satisfaction with this appointment in a letter to to the British Foreign Secretary dated June 16. However, Ibn Saud did not give up and came up with a new plan. Already in the June 24 dispatch, the Consul reported on a conversation with Shaykh Hafiz Wahba: “When he stated that King Ibn Saud wants to have ambassadors in our country and in Hijaz, I explained that reciprocity in these matters is necessary, but it is out of question that there will be the British ambassador in Jeddah. Despite this, the Shaykh declared that he was appointed as Hijazi ambassador here without any agrément or the usual procedure” [from Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, FO 371/13734, E 3252/821/91.]. Wahba expressed a wish that “the political agency in Jeddah would receive a higher status comparable to the importance of Hijaz and Nejd at the present time” [FO 371/13734, E 3252/821/91. P. 25.]. In a document dated June 24, 1929, the Consul reported on the statement of Shaykh Hafiz Wahba: “... King Ibn Saud wants to have ambassadors both in our country and in Hijaz…” By the way, the British, in dealing with Wahba, took into account that in 1927 his personal relationship with the King for a number of reasons had deteriorated [Leatherdale, 1983, p. 87.].
27. George V (1865–1936), British monarch, who ruled throughout 1910–1936.
48 Although with the changed circumstances, the British supporters of raising the level of London’s representation in the Kingdom now had new arguments, they still had to show flexibility. Thus, Bond (in a letter dated July 19) spoke about the level not yet of embassy, but already a plenipotentiary representation in Jeddah headed by an authorized minister plenipotentiary.
49 On behalf of the Foreign Office, Foreign Minister Henderson28 wrote, as was customary, an appeal to King George V, the draft version of which, inter alia, said: “The King of Hijaz and Nejd has for some time urged us to establish full diplomatic relations with Your Majesty. He really wants to open a plenipotentiary representation of Hejaz and Nejd in London and raise the level of our British agency and consulate in Jeddah to the plenipotentiary representation. We consulted with various relevant departments of Your Majesty’s Government,29 and they agreed that it would be desirable to accept this offer.
28. Henderson, Arthur (1863–1935) - British politician and statesman, member of the House of Commons from 1903, in 1911–1934 Labor Party secretary during the First World War, held the position of minister without a portfolio, after the February revolution conducted negotiations in Russia with the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet, in 1924 - Minister of the Interior in the first Labor government, in 1929–1931. Foreign Secretary in the second Labor office of MacDonald, who restored diplomatic relations with the USSR, in 1932-1933. Chaired the international conference on disarmament; in 1934 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

29. The Foreign Office sought the opinion of the Indian Office and Colonial Office.
50 King Ibn Saud, who constantly demonstrates feelings of special friendship towards Britain, certainly has the strongest power in Arabia. He is an independent ruler of most of the Arabian Peninsula, who has achieved the status and prestige that make him a factor of first-class significance in the Muslim East” [FO 371/13734, E 6349/821/91, pp. 123–124].
51 And then the Foreign Office gave a number of arguments in favor of raising the status of representation in the Kingdom. This, in particular, is that it is located on the air route to India, that it has an open thousand-mile border with territories under the British mandate, the security of which depends on friendly relations with Ibn Saud, and that many thousands of Muslim pilgrims from among the Muslim subjects of Great Britain and persons under its patronage, mainly from British India, are sent to visit Mecca every year.
52 But it was not until December 1929 that the British agreed to meet the Saudi authorities and reformat their Consulate into a Plenipotentiary Representation, ​​which meant the establishment of full-fledged diplomatic relations between the two countries. In London, the Saudi government opened their plenipotentiary representation, which was ​​reorganized into an embassy and headed by Hafiz Wahba (the British, however, saw his appointment as a kind of exile). a Plenipotentiary Minister, and then Ambassador to the UK for thirty years.
53 The British could not appoint as their plenipotentiary, who, according to the system adopted in the West, was called a minister plenipotentiary, the very young Bond (although Ibn Saud would have agreed to his candidacy), because minister plenipotentiary was positioned as a representative of the British monarch, and not the consular service of the Foreign Office. Considering that it was difficult to find a solid diplomat who would agree to work in the extremely difficult conditions of Jeddah, they even came up in the Foreign Office with a special schedule for the future head of mission: instead of the usual shortened two-year term for such cases – a standard five-year term, but on the other hand, with the granting of the right to an annual paid four-five-month leave [Leatherdale, 1983, p. 86]. While the search for an experienced diplomat continued, Bond worked as Acting Charge d’Affairs at the mission. Shortly after Sir Andrew Ryan, who had been Consul General in Rabat, Morocco, was appointed to the new position. He handed his credentials to the King in May 1930.
54 It was after this, perhaps at the request of the British, that Ibn Saud reformed his foreign ministry in December 1930, and Emir Faisal, in addition to the post of governor of Hijaz (or the Viceroy), became Foreign Minister. But he was still based in the official capital of Hijaz, Mecca (for Nejd it was, of course, Riyadh), while his deputy Fuad Hamza spent more time in Jeddah. Naturally, access to the King for a non-Muslim plenipotentiary was even more limited, the connection between Jeddah and Mecca was irregular, and the small embassy’s ability to gather information according to the British, was equally small.
55 In the aftermath of the above mentioned enhanced level of the Soviet mission, by the summer of 1930, an important event occurred in the life of the Soviet mission — Nazir Tyuryakulov finally became the Doyen of the diplomatic corps in Jeddah. In a letter to the People’s Commissar dated June 15, 1930, the Plenipotentiary pleased with his success informed: “The ‘historical dispute’ with the British concerning seniority in the diplomatic corps is considered complete and resolved in our favor. As you know, until recently we did not meet with the British. The British did not want to be the first to pay us a visit. With the arrival of the English envoy, Sir Andrew Ryan, the issue was resolved: the latter paid us a visit (I was on Hajj), and quite normal relations have now been established between us and them. At official celebrations, I take first place, and Ryan – second. The French Chargé d’Affaires, Monsieur Maigret – third, Ain ul-Mulk – fourth. The position of the Turk Seni Bey has not yet been established. Angora is silent. Seni Bey, dissatisfied with his present position, evades visiting the celebrations, so as not to sit in the ‘backyard’. I can note that Ryan treats me quite correctly, turning to me in some cases as doyen” [Foreign Affairs Archive of the RF. Fd. 190. Inv. 9. Pf. 5. F. 4. Pp. 28-29].
56

Conclusion
57

The “dual” upgrading of the mission status (reformatting it into the Plenipotentiary Representation Office and granting to the Plenipotentiary the senior post within the diplomatic corps) was regarded as a major achievement of the Soviet diplomacy along the Saudi track. As the Plenipotentiary stated in Mecca: “the purpose of the present appointment is to fortify and strengthen the friendly relations that have been established between the two countries and to the mutual satisfaction of both parties” In response, the Governor said: “I have no doubt that today we are entering a new era in relations between our countries, and this lays a solid foundation for friendship between us” [Foreign Policy Archive of the RF. Fd. 190. Inv. 9. Pf. 5. F. 4. Pp. 28-29].
58 Regarding seniority in the diplomatic corps Tyuryakulov stressed in a letter to Karakhan dated March 10, that now “according to the order established recently by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Hijaz Government, seniority among all diplomatic corps belongs to us” [Foreign Policy Archive of the RF. Fd. 08. Inv. 13. M. 65. P. 43]. And then the head of the mission explained: “The main reason that prompted me to hurry with the presentation of the credentials was the consideration of seniority. It became known only over the last days about the King’s return in a month (and even then conditionally). Knowing Fuad Hamza, I had every reason to expect from him all sorts of “tricks”... From my report you will see that we are now entering a new phase, characterized by an improvement in Soviet-Hijaz relations”.
59 Nazir Bey was right: this momentous time had arrived, but, unfortunately, contrary to his hopes, it turned out to be very short. However, the lessons drawn from the initial years of forging the Soviet-Saudi relationships, as we can ascertain today, have not been wasted.

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