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Mustafa Barzani’s Soviet exile: Popular myths vs. Evidence in Russian archives (Part II)
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Mustafa Barzani’s Soviet exile: Popular myths vs. Evidence in Russian archives (Part II)
Аннотация
Код статьи
S086919080029952-4-1
DOI
10.31696/S086919080029952-4
Тип публикации
Статья
Статус публикации
Опубликовано
Авторы
Мосаки Нодар Зейналович 
ORCID: 0000-0001-8268-006X
Должность: Старший научный сотрудник
Аффилиация: Институт востоковедения РАН
Адрес: Москва, Москва, ул. Рождественка, 12
Раванди-Фадаи Лана Меджидовна
ORCID: 0000-0002-7964-6335
Должность: старший научный сотрудник; доцент
Аффилиация:
Институт востоковедения РАН (ИВ РАН)
РГГУ
НИУ ВШЭ
Адрес: Российская Федерация, Москва
Выпуск
Выпуск 3
Страницы
45-56
Аннотация

The second part of the article about case file of the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani, preserved in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) provides information regarding his material support, in particular, the allocation of apartments, including at an address previously unknown in historical literature. The article also examines information about Mustafa Barzani and the activities of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), contained in the documents, in particular, in KGB reports. In some of them, Mustafa Barzani is characterized extremely negatively – as a reactionary and clerical leader, opposing the integration of Iraqi Kurds into Soviet society and being anti-Soviet; in another, later reference, the personality of Mustafa Barzani is already assessed in the opposite way, due to the Soviet Union's support for the Kurdish liberation movement movements in Iraq. Interesting information is presented about the contradictions in the leadership of the KDP and various aspects of relations with the communists. Considerable attention is paid to documents relating to Barzani’s interaction with his comrades, maintaining control over them, relations with Iraqi public figures, as well as Kurdish activists. Three letters from Barzani to Nikita Khrushchev are studied in detail. 

Archive materials show that Moscow had a very high estimation of Barzani’s role, so information about him was reported to the higher tiers of power, where he was regarded as the most influential person in the Kurdish national movement. Almost every document demonstrates his unwavering adherence to the national idea and his resolve to return to Kurdistan to continue the struggle.

Ключевые слова
Mustafa Barzani, Barzanis, Kurds, Iraqi Kurdistan, Barzani’s exile, Soviet policy
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12.02.2024
Дата публикации
16.06.2024
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1

BARZANI’S LIVING QUARTERS
2 At a meeting with Voloshin on 27 November 1953, Barzani asked the Soviet representative “whether he would soon be moved from the hotel to an apartment” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 292].
3 A document dated 8 January 1954 states that “according to the report of 29.12.1953 by the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council of Deputies Soviet,1 Comrade [Mikhail Alexeevich] Yasnov”, Mustafa Barzani was allocated a two-room apartment of 36.38 sqm at 68 Novopeschanaya ulitsa, Apt. 22 [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 292]. It is notable that there is no mention of this residential address in the literature, or in Kurdish sources. There is a memorial plaque at 50/1 Novoslobodskaya ulitsa, Building 1, with the inscription “The leading figure of the Kurdish national movement, Mustafa Barzani, lived in this building from 1954 to 1958.”2 The report by the head of Moscow to the ID of the CC CPSU on allocating accommodation to Mustafa Barzani evidently shows that the Kurdish leader had quite a high status in the Soviet capital.
1. Corresponds to the present-day Mayor of Moscow.

2. Memorial’naya doska Barzani Mustafe, Portal of open data of the Moscow Government. https://data.mos.ru/opendata/2801/row/2812948?pageNumber=48&versionNumber=1&releaseNumber=6 .
4

ASSESSMENT FORMS REGARDING MUSTAFA BARZANI AND THE KDP
5 The documents containing biographical data on Mustafa Barzani provide fascinating insights into not only the man but Soviet attitudes toward him and his movement. This kind of document is called a spravka in Russian and usually constitutes a resumé or brief description and evaluation of a subject by intelligence personnel. The archives contain only two such documents in which the information coincides to a large extent. Another spravka relates to a message from the KGB about a plenum of the KDP. The fourth contains an assessment of Barzani by the Soviet ambassador to Iraq.
6 The first is dated 13 January 1954 and is an excerpt from a report of 19 August and 10 September 1953 with reference to “Special folder (Osobaya papka) 6693” (Document description – “Special folder. Top secret” (Sovershenno sekretno), i.e. the maximum level of secrecy in the USSR). Evidently, this concerns a report by the KGB about Barzani [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 288–291]. The second is signed by Voloshin. A junior referent (information officer, bureaucrat) of the ID of the CC CPSU, R.S. Varakina,3 notes that it was received from Voloshin on 7 February 1961 [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 196–198].
3. We have not yet been able to find out the full name, only the first letters of his name and patronymic are indicated in the materials.
7 Both documents state that Mullah Mustafa Barzani was born in 1903, a native of the Barzan Region of Iraq, a Kurd by ethnicity, from a family of the sheikh of the tribe (Barzani) [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 196, 288]. The first gives additional information about Mustafa Barzani’s education, his knowledge of languages and information about his family – he had secondary school education, knew Persian and Arabic, had a limited knowledge of Azeri and Russian,4 and his wife and four sons had remained in their homeland [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 288]. With small differences, both documents recount the historical role of the Barzani family and the uprisings organized by them: the father of Mullah Mustafa, Sheikh Muhammed, twice raised an uprising of Kurds against the Turks,5 in 1880 and 1885, for which he was imprisoned, and the Mullah’s elder brother, Sheikh Abdul Salam, led the uprisings of the Kurds in 1904 and 1914. As the documents indicate, “during the second uprising, he travelled through Iran to Russia and appealed to the Tsarist government for help in the battle against the Turks”. On his return from Russia, he was captured by the Turks6 and hanged. After this, the leader of the tribe became Mustafa Barzani’s second brother, Ahmed, who launched rebellions against the Iraqi government three times. After an uprising in 1932, Ahmed and Mullah Mustafa were exiled to the south of Iraq, where they remained until 1942. In 1943, they once more led a rebellion that was once more crushed [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 196, 288]. The 1953 spravka states that the rebels were amnestied and the uprising itself had been staged by the British, who gave the rebels weapons, ammunition, and money [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 288], while the 1961 form states that an uprising was raised against the British and Nuri Said, which was brutally crushed [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 196]. Thus, the role of the British in the uprising of the Kurds in 1943 led by Mullah Mustafa and Ahmed Barzani is assessed in contradictory ways.
4. However, in Iraq at the height of the Kurdish uprising, he spoke with correspondents of western new agencies in Russian. See for example the AP report of 1 March 1963 that Mustafa Barzani was interviewed by an AP correspondent, talking to him in Russian (in the TASS translation). See [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 101].

5. About this and Abdul Salam Barzani in general see also [Barzani, 2005, p. 18–23].

6. It must be noted that Abdul Salam was treacherously captured by the head of the local Kurdish clan Sufia Badalla, who lured Abdul Salam to visit him after his return from Tiflis, which he visited with another renowned Kurdish leader Ismail-agha Shikak (Simko). See [Barzani, 2005, p. 22].
8 Both documents state that in 1944, Barzani established contact with Soviet troop command in Iran [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 196, 288]. The 1953 assessment indicates that in his letters to Soviet command, Barzani condemned “the policy of the British, who tried to use the Kurds for their own interests, and asked for assistance in organizing a new uprising” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 288]. Both documents state that in 1945, Mullah Mustafa moved against the Iraqi government and enjoyed considerable military success, but due to the intervention of the British troops, he was forced to retreat to Iran. Barzani was sentenced to death in absentia for organizing this uprising [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 196, 289].
9 Both documents concur that “in Iraq, Mullah Mustafa Barzani was a member of the progressive Kurdish organization ‘Hiva’ and later headed the ‘Kurdish freedom committee’, which sought to unite the Kurds of the Middle East in an independent Kurdistan”. Regarding Iran, the reports note that “Barzani led the forces of Democratic Kurdistan, the government of which awarded him the title of general” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 196, 288, 289].
10 The size of Barzani’s detachment that entered the USSR in 1947 is recorded as 499 people in one document [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 289], and 500 people in another [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 197].
11 The first document also indicates that “in 1950-1953, the foreign press, including the American and British, featured portraits of Mullah Mustafa Barzani in a general’s uniform with articles describing him as a person commanding great authority among the Kurds, and therefore dangerous for the governments of Turkey, Iraq and Iran” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 289].
12 Beyond this, the contents of these two spravka differ considerably. In the 1953 assessment, Barzani is portrayed in a rather negative light, as a reactionary and clerical leader, opposing the integration of the Iraqi Kurds into Soviet society and harboring an anti-Soviet mindset: “Mullah Mustafa Barzani and his close allies from among reactionary authorities and the clergy cultivate the morals of blind obedience to the Kurdish chieftains, a code of silence, and observation of the Sharia Law and the Koran; they are forbidden to have contact with Soviet citizens, seen as a way to preserve their influence among the Kurds” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 289]. In Moscow Barzani was essentially cut off by Soviet authorities from his allies living in Uzbekistan. He sent regular letters asking them to raise funds and send two entrusted representatives to Moscow, to whom he could give strictly confidential instructions to be reported to members of his detachment, and also to increase control over members of the detachment. Furthermore, in letters to his inner circle, Barzani discussed the issue of his detachment leaving for Iraq, emphasizing that when he returned to Iraq, he would not live by ‘Soviet law’ [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 289–290].
13 The 1961 spravka also contains information about the activities of Barzani after 1953, but here Barzani is portrayed in a very different light, a turnaround largely prompted by the Soviet Union’s support of the Kurdish liberation movement in Iraq, although the personal views of the authors surely also played a role. As we noted earlier, the 1953 document is an excerpt from KGB reports, while the second was prepared by Voloshin of the ID of the CC CPSU, who seems to have been in regular contact with the Kurdish leader and felt a certain sympathy towards him.
14 The 1961 spravka notes that in June 1948, Barzani and his detachment were moved from Baku to the Uzbek SSR, where the leader lived until 1953. In the autumn of 1953, Barzani was enrolled as a student at the HPS in Moscow, where he studied until 1958. In August 1958, he left for Iraq [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 197]. In other words, returning to the question of Barzani’s education in the USSR, we can see that only the HPS is mentioned, not any military academy, let alone the Frunze military academy.
15 The document also mentions Barzani’s desire to “establish contact with the Communist Party” and even his request “for the Communist Party leadership to accept him into their ranks. But Barzani’s request was turned down” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 197]. This statement is an invention and was evidently intended to form a positive image of Barzani in the USSR, especially as it also discusses Barzani’s conflict with communists.
16 According to this spravka, in the summer of 1959, i.e. soon after he returned to Iraq, Barzani had a conflict with former members of the CC KDP, who, as is stated in the document, were secret members of the Iraqi Communist Party, in particular Salih al-Haidari, Hamza Abdulla, Hosrov Taufik, and Nazar Akhmed, who strove to force Barzani out of the party leadership. The Communist Party claimed that Barzani distrusted these people and accused them of “betraying the Kurdish people and attempting to subjugate the party to the communists.” He made efforts to call a KDP congress in order to hold re-elections for leading party positions. Although in Iraq the activity of political parties was banned, Barzani was able to secure Abd al-Karim Qasim’s permission to hold the congress. The former members of the political bureau of the KDP opposed calling the congress, fearing that the party leadership could be joined by “active opponents of the KDP’s cooperation with the communists.” Yet in October of 1959, with the assistance of the majority of KDP members, Barzani was nonetheless able to hold the congress, which took place in the context of a bitter struggle between Barzani’s supporters and the communists. Barzani criticized the activity of the communists in Iraq but stressed that he was not opposed to communists in general, only to those who undermined the Kurdish party’s leadership. Barzani’s supporters who spoke at the congress claimed that the communists had made cooperation with democratic parties impossible. However despite these disagreements, the congress still recognized the need for the KDP to work with the Communist Party and the National Democratic Party [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 197–198].
17 Several years later, influential Western media outlets did not neglect to make note of Barzani’s deep suspicions regarding the communists in the United KDP and his wish to exclude them from the leadership. Barzani believed that “the communists could sacrifice the interests of the Kurds for the interests of the Communist Party” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 136–137]. The communists themselves called him “the most inveterate anti-communist force among the Kurds” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 84]. It is notable that in Barzani’s case file, there is also an interview with Jalal Talabani from an Arab newspaper, in which he describes Barzani as a “devout Muslim who hated communism” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 109]7 A Reuters piece states that Barzani had never been a communist [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 103].
7. In this context, we may also mention Mustafa Barzani’s answer to the question as to whether the Soviet authorities had tried to convert the Iraqi Kurds to communism during their stay in the USSR: “We are Moslems and good Moslems cannot be Communists” [Schmidt, 1964, p. 112].
18 Another document was compiled from a report by the chairman of the KGB Vladimir Semichastny on the plenum of the CC of the KDP held on 12-31 December 1962. The document emphasizes that the report of the KDP's Politburo stated “the need to maintain and strengthen relations with Moscow”, although criticism is also made of the CC CPSU [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 134].
19 The next document (spravka) appears to be an excerpt (vypiska) from a KGB report from 30 March 1963 on a discussion with the ambassador of the USSR in Iraq Mikhail Yakovlev. The ambassador reports that “in the military sense, Barzani is an acknowledged leader, but he has poor political training, he needs advice, and now he needs to be told that, taking into account the situation, he should put pressure on the government and force it to make concessions. For this purpose, anti-government protests must be organized, which will have wide resonance and undoubtedly receive support throughout the country” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 81]. The evaluation of the Kurdish leader by the Russian diplomat concerning problems of political training was not quite accurate, and was to a significant degree based on the wish to promote Soviet interests. Obviously, launching countrywide protests was not an option for Barzani, who was fixated on Kurdish goals. The Soviet Union, nonetheless, tried to involve Barzani in its general Iraq policy, using him to put pressure on Baghdad if necessary.
20 Yakovlev’s political attitude to with Barzani, whose military authority was recognized by the USSR as undisputed, inevitably influenced the conflicts between Mullah Mustafa and the communists. As Yakovlev noted, “Barzani does not like communists, and in 1959-1960 he helped Qasim drive the Iraqi Communist Party underground” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 81]. It is significant that at approximately the same time, Western news agencies reported that Mustafa Barzani had sent his representatives to Moscow with a request for weapons deliveries, but the USSR refused [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 80].
21 Another document (spravka) was compiled by R.S. Varakina, in June 1964 on the basis of a KGB report.8 The document states that “serious disagreements have arisen in the KDP on the issue of a truce with the Iraqi government. As a result, two groups have arisen, one of which is headed by Mustafa Barzani, and the other by Jalal Talabani. Barzani favors a truce, Talabani the renewal of military operations” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 26.].
8. It states at the end of this document that the grounds for compiling it was a report by “Comrade Ivashutin” from 18 May 1964. Peter (Pyotr) Ivanovich Ivashutin was in 1963–1987 the Head of the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) of the Defense Ministry of the USSR and Deputy Head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Evidently, Ivashutin sent a report to the KGB, and from there material was sent to the ID of the CC CPSU, which already compiled its own document. In 1964 he was Colonel General, and subsequently General of the Army.
22

COMPROMISED CONVERSATIONS: INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ON BARZANI’S MEETINGS
23 An excerpt (vypiska) from a report by the Head of the Second Main Directorate (Glavnoe Upravlenie) of the KGB,9 Pyotr Fedotov,10 of 3 January 1955 (“Special Folder 0029”11 and classified as top secret) [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 283–284] appears to be the result of a wiretap on Barzani’s apartment. This document concerns Barzani’s interactions with his close ally As'ad Khoshavi,12 one of the most influential people in the Barzani’s detachment.
9. The Second Main Directorate of the KGB was responsible for counter-intelligence. Evidently the 8th Department of this Directorate dealt with the Iraqi Kurds, the division which carried out surveillance of foreigners in the USSR.

10. Pyotr Vasilyevich Fedotov (1901–1963) was a renowned figure in the Soviet Special Service, a lieutenant general. In 1954-1956, he was Head of the Second Main Directorate of the KGB. In 1959, he was dismissed from the KGB and expelled from the party “for breaking socialist lawfulness in the Stalinist period”, and deprived of the title of lieutenant general.

11. Documents which began with the numbers “00” indicated the classification “top secret”.

12. During his stay in the USSR, Barzani had two close allies – Mir Haj and As'ad Khoshavi.
24 In September-October 1954, Khoshavi was with Barzani in Moscow to resolve the issue of transferring his group from Uzbekistan to one of the central regions of Russia or Ukraine. In conversations with Khoshavi, Barzani said he had raised the issue of transferring the detachment with the Soviet government several times without having received any definite answer [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 283]. For Barzani, it was critical that the detachment be moved away from the periphery, i.e. out of what he saw as a kind of oblivion. Practically all of Barzani’s activity after Stalin’s death and his move to Moscow was directed toward this end.
25 The report further states that Barzani “told As'ad Khoshavi fictions about how he often met with the heads of the [Communist] party [of the Soviet Union] and the Soviet government, received as much money as he wanted in Moscow, and had access to the shop of the CC CPSU. Barzani said he had recently been summoned by one of the heads of the Soviet government, who showed him statements and letters written by the Kurds about Barzani and Khoshavi’s inappropriate behavior. Barzani said that the Soviet government considered these Kurds who wrote statements against him to be enemies just like American and British spies, and therefore, they should be arrested” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 283].
26 The memoirs of KGB officer Alexander Kiselyov shed light on this. In 1959, Kiselyov accompanied “the Barzanis” on the “Gruziya” steamer from the USSR to Iraq.13 The Kurds generally spoke very respectfully of their leader, but some were critical, believing that while living in Moscow and enjoying benefits ordinary Kurds lacked, Barzani had “lost touch with his community” [Kiselyov, 2003, p. 42]. It is not difficult to imagine the difficulties Barzani had maintaining his leader status abroad. When he talked with his allies about the importance the USSR attached to him, exaggerating his status, he was trying to maintain his credibility and authority from a distance.
13. Alexander Viktorovich Kiselyov, KGB officer, major general, was the head of the 8th Department (direct operations) of “S” Directorate (special operations) of the 1str Main Directorate (Foreign intelligence) of the KGB. In the 1960s, he was a Soviet resident in “North Iraq” (Iraqi Kurdistan).
27 According to information gathered by the KGB, Barzani tried to undermine the authority of Sheikh Suleiman,14 former head of the council of detachment. Through Khoshavi, Barzani gave orders that neither Sheikh Suleiman nor Khakim Yasin nor Khalil Ibrahim were to be obeyed. Khakim Yasin and Khalil Ibrahim had previously served on the council and been opposed to moving the detachment out of Uzbekistan. The majority of the men heeded Khoshavi, while the others, according to the intelligence, were frightened with the threat of murder. In November-December 1954, allies of Khoshavi were elected to the Council [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 283–284].
14. Sheikh Suleiman – Mustafa Barzani’s nephew, son of Sheikh Abdul Salam Barzani.
28 It is hard today to understand the precise reasons for the conflict between Barzani and Sheikh Suleiman, but based on the above report, we may assume that the latter was evidently under some degree of influence or control by the Soviet authorities, cooperating with them, while Barzani opposed any USSR control over the detachment. For Mustafa Barzani his time in the USSR was temporary, and his main goal was to return to Iraq and continue the struggle. To do this, Barzani needed to maintain sole control over the detachment.
29 Excerpts from conversations between Barzani and Khoshavi (and Hassan Husami), which took place in July 1959, are provided in a document15 prepared on 9 September 1957 by the head of the 9th Department (otdel) of the Second Main Directorate of the KGB,16 Colonel Voronin,17 in which Barzani spoke of the future of Kurdistan, favoring its independence:
15. Document classified “Special folder. Top secret”

16. The 9th Department of the Second Main Directorate of the KGB was the investigative department.

17. Voronin refers to a KGB agent who reported to him the content of Barzani’s negotiations, i.e. with his inner circle.
30 Kurdistan must become an independent autonomous republic. The British should leave. We do not want to see them there. The people do not want to accept them. The people want to gain independence… If I am given 30,000 soldiers and weaponry, then I will be able to defeat Iran and Iraq…” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 280]
31 In talks with his inner circle (primarily with Khoshavi) from July 1957, Barzani “began to talk more often… about his role as the leader of the Kurds” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 280], announcing that if the USSR “does not recognize him as the leader of the national liberation movement of the Kurds, then he would prefer to go to one of the Arab countries (Syria or Egypt), even if death awaits him there.” Thus, Barzani’s main goal was to resume the struggle of the Kurds under his own leadership, and not to live in the USSR under certain privileged conditions. And as Voronin reports, Barzani informed his circle that he allegedly had discussed this issue with a functionary of the CC CPSU on 27 July 1957 [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 280–281].
32 In conversations with his inner circle, Barzani also discussed problems of life in the USSR. On 15 July 1957, at a meeting with As'ad Khoshavi and several Kurdish students who were visiting Moscow during their holidays, Barzani said that if it were not for fear, the majority of the Soviet people would be against the decision of the Communist Party passed by the CPSU Central Committee Plenum in June 1957 on the so-called “anti-party group” (Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov, who were opposed to Khrushchev) [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 280–281]. That is, Barzani believed that the Soviet people as a whole were opposed to Khrushchev.
33

KGB REPORTS ON MUSTAFA BARZANI’S MEETINGS WITH IRAQI PUBLIC FIGURES
34 In mid-1957, the renowned Iraqi public figure Aziz Sharif came to the Soviet Union as part of an Iraqi delegation of Partisans of Peace. On 13 July 1957 he visited Barzani in his apartment. Information about this meeting was given in the above-mentioned document of 9 September 1957 signed by KGB Colonel Voronin.
35 In the discussion that took place in Kurdish, they did not speak out against the USSR or the Iraqi Communist Party, according to the KGB report. As this fact was mentioned, it may be assumed that the Soviet authorities allowed for the possibility of such statements. Aziz Sherif declared the need for the collective struggle of the Arabs and Kurds against imperialism and the Baghdad Pact, and for Leninism, noting that if such an authoritative person as Barzani returned to Iraq, “more people would join the struggle against reactionism”. Mustafa Barzani, speaking very modestly about himself, nevertheless asserted that with tens of thousands of tanks and weapons, he would conquer all of Iraq in a day. If he were allowed to incite all the Kurdish tribes, there would be no question of his being able to accomplish this. At the same time, Barzani pointed out that it was premature to talk of a Communist Iraq, whose people were “backward” and “peasants”, especially the Kurds. Sherif, hoping to convince Barzani to join a common Iraqi national front, was disappointed by this position, the goal of which was only a struggle for Kurdish rights. As Voronin writes, Sherif was dissatisfied with the meeting and told one of the Kurds:
36 I wanted to talk to him (Barzani) about the movement in Iraq, about the activity of the [Iraqi] communist party, about the creation of a national front, but he constantly talked about the Kurdish religious figure Qazi Muhammad, whom no one is interested in at the moment… [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 279–280]
37

KGB REPORTS ON BARZANI’S MEETINGS WITH KURDISH POLITICAL AND PUBLIC FIGURES FROM ABROAD
38 In late July-early August 1957, the 6th  World Festival of Youth and Students was held in Moscow. Among those attending were Jalal Talabani18 and Qadri Jan Abdul Kadir Aziz (in Kurdish – Qedrîcan).19 On 10 August, they met with Barzani20 and other Kurds living in Moscow. Barzani and Talabani also met on 12 August.21
18. The 24-year-old Jalal Talabani was already a member of the KDP Political Bureau.

19. Qedrîcan (1911–1972) was one of the most famous Kurdish poets of the 20th century. During this meeting in Moscow, Qedrîcan dedicated the poem “Serdarê Kurdan Barzanî” (The leader of the Kurds is Barzani”) to Mustafa Barzani. Talabani and Qedrîcan came to Moscow from Syria.

20. Masoud Barzani also gives information about this meeting in his book [Barzani, 2005, pp. 183–184). However, it contains certain errors, although these are not the subject of the present work.

21. A report on this meeting was sent to the CC CPSU by the Second Main Directorate of the KGB on 5 October 1957 [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 275–276].
39 Two main issues were discussed at the meeting on 10 August: “on broadcasting radio programs from the USSR in Kurdish, and preparing a congress of Kurds.” A letter was written to the Soviet government requesting for broadcasting to begin in the Kurdish language [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 275]. It should be noted that broadcasting in Kurdish had already begun in test mode in Yerevan in 1955. Widescale radio broadcasting began in 1957, and we may assume this letter to have played a decisive role.
40 Preparations for the congress which was planned to be held within one to two years were entrusted to three Kurds who had studied in London.
41 In conversations with Talabani and with Kurds who were in the USSR, Barzani expressed dissatisfaction with his position, comparing it to a prison sentence, as “he did not have the right even to give orders to members of his detachment,” to visit cities in which members of the detachment lived; while Nazim Hikmet, according to Barzani, was able to act at his own discretion. Barzani was also unhappy that the Soviet authorities underestimated his role.
42 In response, Talabani called for Mustafa Barzani to be patient towards the attitude of the Soviet authorities. Taking into account the subsequent important role of Talabani in Kurdish, Iraqi, and international politics, including relations with the USA and the UK, we quote his words in full:
43 …we do not have another country besides Moscow. We need it, if they throw us out the door, we will enter by the window, and if they throw us out the window, we will crawl in through another window. If they don’t help us this year, they’ll help us next year… We have ruined our relations with the Americans and the British so much that they can never be fixed. Apart from here, we have nowhere to turn to… [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 275–276]
44

BARZANI’S LETTERS TO KHRUSHCHEV
45 Barzani’s personal dossier contains three letters from the Kurdish leader to the First Secretary of the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev. The first letter is handwritten (but not in Barzani’s hand) and signed 30 October 1957 in the name of “Barzani Mustafa” [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 272] with an envelope bearing the sender’s address as 50/52 Novoslobodskaya ulitsa,22 Apt. 125,23 Moscow, and with the signature A.A. Mamedov [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 273]. According to a note made on the letter, it was received by the secretariat of the CC CPSU on 3 November 1957.
22. As noted above, now this address is 50/1, Building 1, Novoslobodskaya ulitsa, Moscow.

23. It is this address (although adding that the apartment was located on the 5th floor) that Ordikhane Dzhalil also indicated in his work [Dzhalil, 2003, p. 45].
46 The context of the letter is the Syrian crisis of August-October 1957, in which Turkey threatened to invade Syria and the Soviet Union supported Syria. The situation presented an opportunity for Barzani to increase the role of the Kurdish factor for the Soviet leadership and to confirm himself as the leader of the Kurds and to resume political activity in the Middle East. This letter is interesting not only historically, but in the context of the present situation in Syria. As the letter is not long, we reproduce it in full:
47 To the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Comrade N.S. Khrushchev
48 As we know, the Turkish ruling circles, nurturing the absurd idea of restoring the Ottoman empire, have thrown Turkey into the nets set by American imperialism. Acting behind the back of the Turkish people, they are dragging Turkey into a reckless enterprise against freedom-loving Syria. The Kurdish people along with all peoples of the world are indignant at the brazen action of the American vassals – Turkey. The 5 million Kurds who live in Turkey, like the Turkish people, may be deceived by force or through the lying propaganda of the West and act against their own interests.
49 At this important moment, we Kurdish political émigrés living in the USSR cannot stand aside and do nothing. We are prepared to resort to any measures and sacrifices to restrain the aggression.
50 With these considerations, I appeal to you and ask for your assistance so that our voice can reach the Kurdish people to explain the truth to them, and if war breaks out, to volunteer on the side of the Syrian people.
51 30.10.1957. Mustafa Barzani [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 272].
52 In Barzani’s second letter to Khrushchev, of 9 June 1958 and received by the CC CPSU on the same day, the Kurdish leader writes that he is sending the First Secretary of the CC CPSU an “letter from the Committee of Kurds in Europe” that he has received, adding that he asks to examine the Kurds’ request and take necessary measures to help the Kurdish people [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 257].
53 Two further letters are attached to this letter, both in Russian.
54 The 1st letter, 2 pages long, from the “Commission of Kurds in Europe… To the Great Kurdish Commander Mustafa Barzani”, is typewritten [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 257–258]. In this letter, 25 Kurdish students from different countries who gathered in London on 2 January 1958, highly valuing the activities of Mustafa Barzani, report that they have create an organization named “Scientific and Cultural Association of Kurdish Students in Europe”, designed to spread information about Kurdistan and has published the journal “Kurdistan.” The letter states that members of the organization appeal “to gather patriotic Kurds from different countries, people of different political convictions and professions, at a congress devoted to Kurdistan in order to develop a common and unified path for all Kurds” that will meet with broad approval. They have begun preparing for the congress. As the authors of the letter state, they have appealed to the “Organization of Countries of Asia and Africa, which met in Cairo,24 for permission… to take part in the work of the conference,” but were refused because of the absence of a Kurdish state. They asked Barzani to pass on their request that the Soviet authorities organize regular radio broadcasts in Kurdish from Moscow or another city. The Commission of Kurds goes on to praise the Soviet Union and state its anti-imperialist position. Perhaps Barzani himself was involved in writing this letter, given his great desire to persuade the Soviet government to begin broadcasts in Kurdish.
24. At the 1st conference of solidarity of countries of Asia and Africa, held in Cairo from 26 December 1957 to 1 January 1958, the Solidarity Council of the Afro-Asian Countries was created. At the 2nd conference in 1960, this organization was renamed the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization.
55 The second, handwritten letter, from 4 June 1958, is addressed to the “leader of the Kurds” and signed by 15 fourth-year students at the Tashkent Agricultural Tekhnikum.25 They had completed their studies and were soon to become qualified junior agriculturalists. Wishing to continue their studies, they asked Barzani to petition for them to be sent to the Moscow Timiryazev Agricultural Academy [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 260–261].
25. In the USSR, secondary specialized (professional, vocational) educational institute (Technical schools), the study period on the basis of incomplete secondary education was 3-4 years and full secondary education – 2-3 years. Tekhnikums trained technicians and specialists for various sectors of industry and agriculture.
56 Barzani wrote his third letter to Khrushchev before returning to Iraq from a trip to the USSR in November 1960 to take part in celebrations of the October Revolution. He stayed in the USSR until early January 1961. The letter is dated 10 January 1961 [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 201-202].
57 Barzani expresses his gratitude to Khrushchev “for the hospitality provided during his… stay in the USSR”, and the hope that talks with Khrushchev’s “deputies”26 would “have serious support in the struggle of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and the Kurdish people against imperialism and reactionism.” He also expressed his hope of shaking Khrushchev’s hand at their next meeting [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 201–202].27 From all appearances, Barzani’s rather lengthy trip to the USSR was to meet with Khrushchev in connection with a possible escalation in Iraq and the assistance of the Soviet Union to the Kurds. Soon afterwards (some 8 months later), Barzani’s supporters sent a telegram to Khrushchev asking him to submit the Kurdish issue to the UN for review and to cease supplies of weapons to the Iraqi army, which was employing them against peaceful citizens in Kurdistan [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 190].
26. We should note that Khrushchev, as the First Secretary of the CC CPSU, to whom Mustafa Barzani’s letter is addressed, did not have deputies. However, from 1958 Khrushchev also held the position of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Prime Minister), but the Council of Ministers, as is well-known, did not deal with the Kurdish issue, which remained the prerogative of the CC CPSU and the KGB. So the word “deputies” should not be understood literally, but as high-ranking members of the CC CPSU, primarily from the ID and the KGB.

27. We should note that the letter was addressed to the Head of the ID of the CC CPSU Boris Ponomaryov [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 200].
58 Masoud Barzani also writes about the visit of his father to the USSR “at the invitation of the Soviet government to celebrate the anniversary of the October Revolution.” He gives the period of his father’s visit as from 5 November 1960 to 13 January 1961 [Barzani, 2005, p. 297–298]. The Pravda reported briefly: “On 6 November, at the invitation of the Presidium of the Union of Societies of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, the prominent public figure of the Iraqi Republic, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, arrived in Moscow”.28 It is significant that in this report Mustafa Barzani is presented only by his Iraqi identity, which is somewhat comic, as it was well-known that he was the leader of the Kurds and the Kurdish movement. From this report, we may already guess the results of his visit to the USSR. But in his book, Masoud Barzani notes that the Kurdish leader was “met in Moscow with exceptional warmth, and held extensive talks, including with Khrushchev” [Barzani, 2005, p. 298]. But as Mustafa Barzani’s letter to Khrushchev shows, on this visit he was not able to meet with the Soviet leader.29
28. Pravda, 7 November 1960.

29. Of course, theoretically this meeting may have taken place between the date that the letter was written (10 January 1961) and Mustafa Barzani’s return to Baghdad (13 January 1961), but given the time required for traveling (at least 1 day) and the tone of the letter, which was evidently written directly before his departure, this meeting was no longer envisaged.
59 It is significant that in September 1962, Barzani criticized the USSR, seeming to engage in that classic game of playing the superpowers off of one another. He proposed that the US make the Kurds the main ally of the West in the Middle East, and yet at the same time threatened to “accept assistance from the communists” should the Americans fail to lend the desired support [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 156–157].
60

INFORMATION ON KGB SURVEILLANCE OF BARZANI
61 Barzani’s dossier contains a document signed by the deputy head of the 2nd division of the 9th Department of the Second Main Directorate of the KGB, Colonel Chaikun, of 8 February 1957 [RGASPI-Barzani, p. 264–271], under the name “List of connections of the head of the Kurdish detachment for Moscow.” This list contains 48 people with whom Mustafa Barzani interacted from 18 July 1953 to September 1956. As we can see, Barzani was under the constant KGB surveillance. In this document, Barzani is called “Mamedov” or “Mikhail”. The Kurdish leader used some of the people on the list to contact fellow tribesmen. One acquaintance who was leaving for a trip to the Saratov province brought him a “letter from Kurds studying at the Pugachyovsk’s30 Tekhnikum.”
30. Pugachevsk is a town in the Saratov province.
62 Evidently, this is the Pugachyovsk’s Hydromeliorative Tekhnikum. Its website states:
63 “In 1957, a group of 25 Kurds, members of the national liberation movement in Iran, studied at our Tekhnikum. They were sent for training by higher authorities ... The training was conducted in Russian. They took an active part in the social life of the Tekhnikum, assisted the collective (kolkhozs) and soviet farms (sovkhozs) of the Pugachevsk’s district. In March 1959, they left for their homeland.”31
31. >>>>
64 Masoud Barzani writes that after Mustafa Barzani came to Moscow, his men were given the opportunity to study at various universities, such as Saratov University [Barzani, 2005, p. 182]. Perhaps Masoud, knowing that some of the Kurds had gone to study in Saratov, or rather in the Saratov Province, erroneously identified their place of study as Saratov University instead of the Pugachevsk’s Hydromeliorative Tekhnikum.
65

CONCLUSION
66 Even though information about the life of Mustafa Barzani in the Soviet Union is contained in the book by Masoud Barzani and partially in other works, several circumstances remain unknown, as archive documents show. Archive materials allow us to gain more specific information about the nature and place of study of the Kurdish leader in Moscow and about his title as officer of the Soviet army, or rather the lack thereof.
67 Although Moscow saw Barzani as a possible ally in the region, and as an ally of the Iraqi communists, the Kurdish leader did not enjoy the complete trust of his hosts. Furthermore, the archive contains reports by Special Services officers in which Barzani is almost openly described as an anti-communist. It is also true, however, that Soviet leadership took a pragmatic approached and realized Barzani’s primary motives were not ideologically problematic (i.e., anti-Soviet) but that he was driven by a natural nationalism. Moscow had a very high estimation of Barzani’s role, so information about him was reported to the higher tiers of power, where he was regarded as the most influential person in the Kurdish national movement. Moscow obviously took the greatest interest in Barzani during the escalation of the Kurdish problem. Archive materials also reflect the tactical maneuvers Barzani resorted to with his allies in order to maintain his leadership while far from home.
68 Despite Barzani’s relatively elevated status and living standard (this especially concerns the period he spent in the Soviet capital), almost every document demonstrates his unwavering adherence to the national idea and his resolve to return to Kurdistan to continue the struggle.32
32. In this sense, Martin van Bruinessen’s description of Mustafa Barzani as an adherent of “simple and pragmatic nationalism” [Bruinessen, 1986, p. 16], is quite justified. Evidently, it was this approach that was the main reason for Mustafa Barzani’s success.
69 The materials contained in the dossier are highly relevant to study the Kurdish history in the twentieth century and the process of forming the Kurdish policy of the USSR after WWII.

Библиография

1. РГАСПИ, Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории. Фонд 495. Опись 216. Дело 141. Название дела: Мустафа Барзани (Мамедов).

2. Барзани М. Мустафа Барзани и курдское освободительное движение (1931–1961 гг.). СПб: «Наука», 2005.

3. Джалил О. Мои встречи с Барзани и барзанцами. 100 лет Мустафе Барзани: сб. 1903-1979 / Представительство Регионального Правительства Иракского Курдистана в России и странах СНГ. М., 2003. С. 45–51.

4. Киселёв А.В. Большое видится на расстоянии. 100 лет Мустафе Барзани: сб. 1903-1979 / Представительство Регионального Правительства Иракского Курдистана в России и странах СНГ. М., 2003. С. 42–44.

5. van Bruinessen M. The Kurds between Iran and Iraq. Middle East Report. 1986. No. 141. Pp. 14-27.

6. O’Ballance E. The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94. L.: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.

7. Schmidt D.A. Journey Among Brave Men. With a foreword be Justice William O. Douglas. Boston & Toronto: Brown and Company, 1964.

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